Daseins Shadow and the Moment of its Dis

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In his 1937 lectures, Heidegger searches for Nietzsche's initial thought of " the Moment ". This paper mimics Heidegger's pursuit of Nietzsche's Moment by tracing Heidegger's own early arrival at the Moment in Being and
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  Rachel Aumiller If you would like to cite this article please refer to the  published version in  Human Studies: A Journal for  Philosophy and the Social Sciences  (May 2016). 1DASEIN’S SHADOW AND THE MOMENT OF ITS DISAPPEARANCE Abstract: In his 1937 lectures, Heidegger searches for Nietzsche’s initial thought of “the Moment”. This paper mimics Heidegger’s pursuit of Nietzsche’s Moment by tracing Heidegger’s own early arrival at the Moment in  Being and Time , published 10 years prior to his lectures on Nietzsche. Both Zarathustra and Dasein are chased in and out of an authentic relationship with the Moment by their own shadows, which disappear at midday. Dasein’s shadow is the being that is always closest-at-hand, the being in whom I lose myself in everyday care. Dasein forgets itself in inauthentically securing its identity in that which it cares for and that which it is not, darkness. Yet Dasein also confronts its own finitude in its negative double as it witnesses the daily dwindling of its shadow—the everyday  passing away  of time. Keywords:  Heidegger, Nietzsche, temporality, everydayness, authenticity, The Moment, the EveryoneIn his 1937 lecture course on Nietzsche, Heidegger traces the recurrence of “the Moment” in Nietzsche’s published and unpublished writings. “The Moment,” that midday hour in which all shadows disappear, represents for  Nietzsche the possibility of a transformed stance toward beings in the world. While the Moment is a kind of temporal transfiguration, Nietzsche identifies it, not as a positive event in time, but rather as an imperceptible shift occurring between the beats of ordinary time. In this sense, as Heidegger notes, the Moment [  Augenblick  ], passing in a glance or a blink of the eye, appears as nothing (1984:140). Because the Moment is experienced as nothing more than a glitch in ordinary time, it would seem to be beyond representation. Nietzsche stresses this in characterizing the Moment negatively by silence and blindness (a blink of the eye). Yet Heidegger nevertheless attempts to retell  Nietzsche’s own experience of the Moment, locating Nietzsche’s initial thought of it in his unfinished notes and  personal letters, in its first published appearance in The Gay Science , and finally in its most developed recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Heidegger’s task is strained not only because he attempts to explicate a Moment that evades representation but also because of Heidegger’s own emphasis on the singularity of Moment: we cannot relive the Moment through another’s account of it. The hour of the midday sun does not represent a doctrine that can be learned and reiterated but rather the Moment must strike me in my ownmost [ eigenst  ] loneliest loneliness. 1   1  As John Rose argues (2009), Heidegger desires a shift from the temporal framework that structures our historical epoch, which is dominated by metaphysical thinking, to an epoch structured by a new temporal framework; yet Heidegger himself admits that he cannot think “ the moment” of this temporal shift from within time. Rose argues that the interruption of everyday time or the questioning of time is a temporality in itself and must be thought within time. Although I agree with Rose that Heidegger fails to think the Moment of the interruption of everyday from within time, I think this is because there is kind of temporality that cannot be represented in philosophical thought. It is precisely at the edge of philosophical thought—where metaphysical thinking fails—that the Moment is experienced (to say this differently, it is at this edge that Dasein temporalizes itself in such a way as to usher in a  Rachel Aumiller If you would like to cite this article please refer to the  published version in  Human Studies: A Journal for  Philosophy and the Social Sciences  (May 2016). 2Unlike ordinary time or world time [ Weltzeit  ], which I necessarily have in common with everyone—the time of the Everyone [ das    Man ]—the Moment is my Moment that no one else can share. Yet, as Nietzsche portrays it in Thus Spoke Zarathustra , one often approaches the Moment with the company of another. Even if we cannot enter this Moment together we find ourselves again  standing before it. As Zarathustra tells the dwarf, “You and I in the gateway: must we not return eternally?” (Nietzsche 2006: 126). From this view it is appropriate for Heidegger to chase after Nietzsche’s most hermitic thoughts in his private notebooks or to be chased by the shadow of  Nietzsche’s doctrine of the return in the pursuit of his own Moment. In this spirit, I wish to mimic Heidegger’s  pursuit of Nietzsche’s Moment by tracing Heidegger’s own early arrival at the Moment in  Being and Time ,  published 10 years prior to his lectures on Nietzsche. Heidegger’s Moment (or Dasein’s Moment) comes to light in  Being and Time  in the second division in Heidegger’s discussion of the ontological significance of the temporality belonging to everydayness [  Alltäglichkeit  ]. One thing that Zarathustra and Dasein have in common is that both are chased in and out of an authentic relationship with the Moment by their own shadow, which disappears in the experience of the midday hour. In both cases, the shadow is the (anti)companion who stands with the self before the gateway. In the following pursuit of Heidegger’s Moment, I explore how Dasein’s shadow is the being that is always closest-at-hand, the being in whom I lose myself in everyday care. In caring for its shadow, which Heidegger identifies with the natural justification for ordinary  public time, Dasein loses sight of a more srcinary temporalization of time, which appears as nothingness or timelessness against the regulated succession of organized time. However, the character of the shadow is double: for while Dasein forgets itself in inauthentically securing its identity in what it cares for, that which it is not, darkness, it also confronts its own finitude in witnessing the daily dwindling of its shadow—the everyday  passing away  of time. In fleeing its finitude in the infinity of the public time of the shadow, Dasein runs into the certain and yet indeterminate possibility of its own death, realized fully in the Moment of the shadow disappearance. 2  new relationship to everyday time). Heidegger pushes his own thinking to this edge by taking on the impossible task of representing Nietzsche’s moment. It is impossible to catch a shadow but the chase leads us unexpectedly into a new space that at first appears without definition because it lacks the contrast of darkness and light. It is necessary to try to think the unthinkable, to try (and to fail) to think the Moment from within a temporal framework in which it cannot appear. 2  In his recent article “Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger’s  Being and Time ” (2015), K. M. Stroh explores how Dasein overcomes the view of itself as a discrete individual (over and against other individual Dasein) by experiencing itself in the inauthentic community of the Everyone (or the Anyone/the They). Dasein’s absorption in the Everyone conceals a deeper way that Dasein may authentically speak in the collective first person without  Rachel Aumiller If you would like to cite this article please refer to the  published version in  Human Studies: A Journal for  Philosophy and the Social Sciences  (May 2016). 3 Dasein’s Sun King In the final chapter of  Being and Time , Heidegger turns to an analysis of everyday time, which he associates with the natural movement of the sun. For Heidegger, common time, which we regulate and measure by the use of “time-reckoning instruments” like calendars and clocks, is linked to an inauthentic relationship to the present. This is so  because the regularity of public time ordered by a succession of “nows” [ die    Jetztfolge ] conceals a different kind of moment, which cannot be counted (or counted on) in the same way we count the hours of the day. Even so, Heidegger attends to everyday time at the end of  Being and Time  to reveal its ontological and existential necessity in the primordial structure of care [ Sorgestruktur  ]. The way we care for time itself, by organizing our time into structured hours of the days, which we often “use up” in advance in planning how we will spend our time, points to the way Dasein takes time and loses time. This is also the way Dasein has time or does not have time for the beings it encounters in the world. While everyday time is shaped by our activity of dividing time into regulated units, it is not grounded in number for Heidegger as it is for Aristotle (see for example, Aristotle 1983: 4.10, 218a7; 4.11, 219b2). As Heidegger puts it, “What is existentially and ontologically decisive about reckoning with time must not  be seen in the quantification of time, but must be more primordially conceived in terms of the temporality of Dasein reckoning with time” (2010: 392/412). As we will explore, Heidegger suggests that time reckoning first arises out of a desire to save space in order to have space for that which requires our care. Our care for time reflected in the everyday regulated structure of time is not merely the condition for having time for others, rather the time that we share with others is Dasein’s very being-in-the-world-with-others or the Everybody arising from the primordial structure of care.Heidegger imagines Dasein’s relationship to ordinary time prior to the development of time-reckoning instruments to show that the common understanding of public time, although an inauthentic relationship to the  present, has justification in the natural world and deeper justification in the ontological structure of care. Heidegger emphasizes Dasein’s dependency on the sun, especially prior to the invention of handy objects like lights, which can turn night into “day,” and clocks, by which we know the position of the sun without any indication from the natural neutralizing the first person singular; and yet the experience of the everyone is also what allows Dasein to understand its inherent intersubjectivity. I parallel and extend this argument by exploring the temporality belonging to the Everyone: shadow-time. I show how the specific temporality of the Everyone is both the condition of community but also that which conceals the community’s being in care.  Rachel Aumiller If you would like to cite this article please refer to the  published version in  Human Studies: A Journal for  Philosophy and the Social Sciences  (May 2016). 4world. On the most basic level, the sun is important to Dasein because it lights up the world revealing what may be cared for. As he puts it, “Everyday circumspect being-in-the-world needs the possibility of sight, that is, brightness, if it is to take care of things at hand within what is present”   (2010: 392/412). However, the sun not only reveals the individual objects at hand but first and foremost the context in which objects are in relation. In this way, the sun is the condition for the relevance of the objective things in the world, which are presented in a context that lets them be known in their usefulness. The sun is the condition for the presencing of things in sight but also for the foresight of things not yet  present; in anticipating the dawn and the tasks that the new day will bring, Dasein is ahead of itself in its care for the future. Thus, we say to ourselves, “Then, when the sun rises, it is time for  …” Dasein’s dependency on the sun for sight and foresight reveals how Dasein’s discovery of its surrounding environment [ öffentliche Umwelt  ] and its natural environment [ Umweltnatur  ] must correspond   (2010: 393/413). Dasein awaits the conditions of the natural world, the rising of the sun, for example, to open up the world as something that may be discovered. For the  presencing of things in sight, the sun must be in line with objective innerworldly things. However, the foresight of care also requires Dasein to align its own body with the various positions of the sun throughout the day. This  personal correspondence of my own bodily position with the spatial position of this heavenly body furthers the  possibility for caring for, not only what is immediately at hand, but also the possibility of being-there-for-others in the future. Heidegger explains: Like sunrise, sunset and noon are distinctive ‘places’ that this heavenly body occupies…This dating of thing in terms of the heavenly body giving forth light and warmth, and in terms of its distinctive ‘places’ in the sky, is a way of giving time which can be done in our being-with-one-another ‘under the same sky,’ and which can be done for ‘everyone’ at any time in the same way so that within certain limit everyone is initially agreed upon it. (2010: 393/413)The constancy of the sun makes possible our own constancy for others. Because we are able to count (on) the regularly recurring passage of the sun and place ourselves in spatial relations to this reliable body, others may count on us to be present for them. We can say, “When the sun rises tomorrow I will meet you here again as I have done today and the day before”.  In this way, the sun, which is constant and available to all makes possible not only being-with-one-another in the present, by providing us with the vision of a context to which we both belong and thus belong together, but allows for the promise of being-there-for-another in the future.  Rachel Aumiller If you would like to cite this article please refer to the  published version in  Human Studies: A Journal for  Philosophy and the Social Sciences  (May 2016). 5Heidegger’s analysis of “primitive” Dasein’s dependency on the sun may at first seem only significant in terms of Dasein’s ontic experience of the world: the light of the sun makes our surroundings visible; the objective nature of the sun provides a public point of reference for all who are under the same sky; the regularity of the sun allows for the datability of the future (the possibility of making a date). However, the ontological structure of care and the primacy of the future shows itself even in (perhaps especially in) this most natural understanding of time through the daily ascent and descent of the sun.  When Heidegger turns to primitive Dasein’s initial reckoning with time, it is not to point out the underdevelopment of Dasein’s crude conception of everyday time prior to a later more  sophisticated practice of time-reckoning. Nor is it to reveal primitive Dasein’s engagement in the world as ontologically poor. Instead, Heidegger insists that there is something in Dasein’s most natural relationship to the  sun that has been concealed through the development of the science of time and the technology that has come to replace Dasein’s direct attention to the sun. 3   To say that everyday time initially arises from the primordial structure of care is not to deny that primitive Dasein also forgets itself when it temporalizes itself according to the movement of the sun. Perhaps what is most revealing about Dasein’s daily reliance on the sun is that it suggests that, even before being absorbed into the  business of everyday taking care, Dasein has already forgotten itself while awaiting the dawn. In longing for the light of another, Dasein forgets itself as a great light that also illuminates the world to be discovered in care. In  Engaging Heidegger  , Richard Capobianco argues that while in his late work Heidegger denies the connection of lux  with his characterization of Dasein as die    Lichtung  , Heidegger’s early work does employ the illustration of light to describe Being. “One of the fundamental features of his mature position of the 1960s,” Capobianco argues, “is that die Lichtung  , thought metaphorically as a spatial clearing in the wood or forest, is emphatically not to be defined in terms of lux , that is, ‘light’ in the sense of ‘luminosity’ or ‘brightness’. What has 3  James Gilbert-Walsh (2010) offers an insightful discussion of the tension of attempting to think pre-discursive temporality through discursive thought. Gilbert-Walsh argues that Heidegger shows us that this impossible task is also a necessary pursuit if we are to understand the arché  of time. Our very failure to represent an srcinary temporality, which evades discursive thought, interrupts our relationship to everyday time. As I argue Heidegger’s impossible task of representing Nietzsche’s philosophy of the moment—by extension, my own attempt to depict Heidegger’s philosophy of the moment—is a project that explores the tension between two temporal orders. A  philosophical practice that knowingly sets itself up for failure opens itself to its own experience of the moment that occurs at the edge of these orders. Gilbert-Walsh turns to Heidegger to tease out this temporal glitch in the tension  between discursive and pre-discursive being. In the same spirit, I explore the temporal edge where the body and the shadow meet.
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